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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
KENDALL Q. NORTHERN, : Case No. 920116 
Petitioner, : 
v. : 
N. ELDON BARNES, et al., : Priority No. 13 
Respondent. : 
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION 
FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
I. Does the petition present special reasons for certiorari 
review, as required by Rule 46 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
procedure? 
A. Does the Court of Appeals' decision below conflict 
with decisions of this Court? 
B. Did the Court of Appeals address the question of 
whether the Board of Pardons violated its own 
procedural and substantive rules? 
OPINION BELOW 
The Court of Appeals' opinion, Northern v. Barnes, is located 
in 179 Utah Adv. Rep. 15 and is attached as Addendum "A". 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. S 78-2-2(3)(a) (Supp. 1991), which grants the Utah 
Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over Court of Appeals' 
1 
judgments. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Any relevant text of constitutional provisions, statutes, or 
rules pertinent to the resolution of the issue presented is 
contained in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case involves an appeal from the trial court's denial of 
a petition for habeas corpus or other extraordinary relief. 
B, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BELOW 
On March 30, 1990, Northern sought to have certain actions of 
the Board of Pardons declared unlawful and to have the trial court 
order his immediate release. The court held a hearing on July 27, 
1990, at which time it accepted documentary evidence and heard 
counsel's arguments. The court took the matter under advisement at 
the conclusion of the hearing, and on September 26, 1990, dismissed 
the petition. On December 7, 1990, the court entered Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order of Dismissal (attached as 
Exhibit MB"). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS1 
On July 30, 1980, at age eighteen, Northern pleaded guilty to 
1
 The following statement of facts is taken from both the 
Court of Appeals' opinion at 179 Utah Adv. Rep. 15 (attached as 
Exhibit "A") and Judge Hanson's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law and Order of Dismissal, dated December 7, 1990 (attached as 
Exhibit "B"). 
2 
second degree murder and aggravated robbery for his participation 
in the shooting death of a cab driver. On July 8, 1981, the Utah 
Board of Pardons granted Northern a May 10, 1988 parole date. 
During the summer of 1984, the Board of Pardons received 
information from the Utah State Prison which established that 
Northern had abused drugs heavily during the first two years of his 
incarceration, and that he had a serious drug problem. This 
information was not available to the Board of Pardons on July 8, 
1981 when it granted Northern a parole date. The Board of Pardons 
also reconsidered Northern's status in 1984, upon Northern's 
request. At that time, Northern did not express any remorse about 
the crimes he committed or the affected victims. 
Northern was transferred to the Duchesne County Jail in March 
of 1988. Northern subsequently gained trustee status and worked 
outside the jail, unsupervised, during the next two years. In 
February of 1988, Utah State Prison authorities discovered that 
Northern was again using drugs. This information was forwarded to 
the Board of Pardons sometime prior to May 10, 1988, Northern's 
scheduled parole date, but was not available to the Board of 
Pardons on July 8, 1981 when it granted Northern's parole date. On 
March 24, 1988, the Board of Pardons requested that the Utah State 
Prison perform a psychological assessment on Northern. 
The Board of Pardons received a psychological evaluation on 
May 5, 1988, which indicated that Northern had been a heavy drug 
user, and had been unable to cope with life's stresses without 
drugs. The report also noted that Northern admitted being high on 
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LSD at the time he committed the offense, and acknowledged that his 
drug dependency was a major factor contributing to his antisocial 
behavior. The information contained in the May 5, 1988 report was 
not available to the Board of Pardons on July 8, 1981. 
On May 9, 1988, the Board rescinded Northern's May 10th parole 
date, pending further review, and ordered another psychological 
evaluation. Prior to this rescission, Northern was not notified of 
any allegations relating to the revocation, and no hearing occurred 
prior to the Board's May 9th decision. The documented basis for 
the rescission was to "continue for another psychological 
evaluation and complete prison progress report." (Finding of Fact 
13). The second psychological report, prepared May 11, 1988, 
focused on potential problems affecting Northern's adjustment into 
society posed by his relationship with his father. 
On June 23, 1988, the Board scheduled a hearing for July 8, 
1988, to review Northern's status. Northern was notified of the 
hearing by June 28, 1988. At the July 8, 1988 hearing, Northern 
was allowed to address and present information to the Board, and to 
respond to the Board's questions. At the conclusion of the 
hearing, the Board determined that Northern continued to be a risk 
to society, and refused to grant Northern parole at that time. The 
Board scheduled a rehearing for May 1990, and Northern was returned 
to the Duchesne County Jail. 
On October 9, 1988, Northern escaped from the Duchesne County 
jail and fled to Canada. Due to Northern's flight, the Board 
rescinded the scheduled May 1990 rehearing. Northern was captured 
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and returned to prison on October 6, 1989. 
Northern filed for extraordinary and habeas corpus relief on 
March 30, 1990. The petition prayed for (1) declaratory relief as 
to the unlawfulness of Northern's confinement after May 10, 1988, 
(2) a demand for his immediate release, and (3) damages in excess 
of $10,000 for "breach of contract" on the ground that the parole 
date created a legally binding agreement on the State. See Northern 
v. Barnes, 179 Utah Adv. Rep. 15, 16 (Utah App. 1992). After a 
full evidentiary hearing, the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson denied 
the petition. 
The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of the writ. In 
affirming Judge Hanson's denial of the petition, the Court of 
Appeals limited its review to the issue of the unlawfulness of 
Northern's confinement.2 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE PETITION PRESENTS NO SPECIAL REASONS 
FOR CERTIORARI REVIEW, AS REQUIRED BY 
RULE 46 OF THE UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE 
PROCEDURE. 
The appropriateness of certiorari review is governed by Rule 
46 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Rule 46 states, in 
pertinent part: 
2
 The court found no authority for extending the purposes 
of extraordinary relief to address contract claims. It further 
determined that petitioner's demand for immediate parole was moot 
as petitioner was granted parole subsequent to the filing of his 
appeal. See Northern v. Barnes, 175 Utah Adv. Rep. 15, 16 (Utah 
App. 1992). 
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Review by a writ of certiorari is not a matter 
of right, but of judicial discretion, and will 
be granted only for special and important 
reasons. The following • . . indicate the 
character of reasons that will be considered: 
(a) When a panel of the Court of 
Appeals has rendered a decision in 
conflict with a decision of another panel 
of the Court of Appeals on the same issue 
of law; 
(b) When a panel of the Court of 
Appeals has decided a question of state 
or federal law in a way that is in 
conflict with a decision of the Supreme 
Court; 
(c) When a panel of the Court of 
Appeals has rendered a decision that has 
so far departed from the accepted and 
usual course of judicial proceedings . . 
. as to call for an exercise of the 
Supreme Court's power of supervision; or 
(d) When the Court of Appeals has 
decided an important question of 
municipal, state, or federal law which 
has not been, but should be, settled by 
the Supreme Court. 
Utah R. App. P. 46 (1953). Northern's claims do not fall within 
the confines of Rule 46, and therefore are improper for review by 
writ of certiorari. 
A. THE COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION 
THAT HABEAS WAS INAPPROPRIATE 
IN NORTHERN'S CASE IS CORRECT, 
AND DOES NOT CONFLICT WITH 
DECISIONS OF THIS COURT. 
Contrary to Northern's assertions, the Court of Appeals' 
holding that "habeas corpus is not available in this case as a post 
release remedy to modify the release date ordered by the Board [of 
6 
Pardons],"3 does not contradict this Court's recent decision in 
Foote v. Utah Board of Pardons, 808 P.2d 734 (Utah 1991). 
Section 76-3-202(5) of the Utah Code grants the Board of 
Pardons the authority to release an inmate "at any time within 
[its] discretion". Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-202(5) (1989). The Court 
of Appeals correctly determined that the Board of Pardons' 
right to rely on any factors known in May 
1988, or later adduced at the July 1988 
hearing, and the weight to be afforded such 
factors in deciding whether Northern posed a 
societal risk, as well as whether an order of 
restitution was appropriate, are all matters 
within the discretion of the Board. They are 
precisely the kind of issues that are not 
subject to judicial review under section 77-
27-5(3). 
Northern v. Barnes, 179 Utah Adv. Rep. 15, 17 (Utah App. 1992). 
Section 77-27-5(3) states in pertinent part: 
Decisions of the Board of Pardons in cases 
involving paroles, pardons, . . . are final 
and are not subject to judicial review. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-5(3) (1990). The Court of Appeals simply 
held that it would not review discretionary decisions of the Board 
of Pardons. Since Northern's claims related to the Board's 
discretion to grant him parole, they were inappropriate for 
judicial review as well as habeas corpus relief. 
In Foote v. Utah Board of Pardons, 808 P.2d 734 (Utah 1991), 
this Court held that section 77-27-5(3) does not preclude all 
judicial review of Board of Pardons' proceedings. This Court held 
that under the Utah Constitution, an inmate is entitled to due 
3Northern v. Barnes, 179 Utah Adv. Rep. 15, 17 (Utah App. 
1992) (emphasis added). 
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process at Board of Pardons' proceedings, and that such proceedings 
would be reviewed for procedural errors. Foote at 735 (emphasis 
added). Howeverf the Court noted that the number of years a 
defendant will spend in prison is "left to the unfettered 
discretion of the board of pardons," and thus, is not subject to 
judicial review. Foote at 735. Exactly what due process demands 
of the board of pardons "cannot be determined in the abstract, but 
must be determined only after the facts concerning the procedures 
followed by the board are flushed out." Foote at 735. Therefore, 
the Court remanded the case to the trial court to determine what 
procedures the Board followed and to decide what is procedurally 
required in the context of parole hearings. Id. 
The Court of Appeals' decision in this case does not conflict 
with Foote. The court determined that Northern's claims involved 
the "reasonableness of the Board's decision in not granting 
Northern credit for the time served beyond his original parole 
date," not the manner in which the proceedings occurred. 
Northern, 179 Utah Adv. Rep. at 16. Nevertheless, the Court of 
Appeals determined that Northern had been afforded procedural due 
process at his July 8, 1988 hearing and that therefore, his claims 
did not involve the type of issues addressed in Foote.4 Northern, 
179 Utah Adv. Rep. at 16. There is no conflict between the 
Northern and Foote decisions, as both cases hold that Utah courts 
will review alleged procedural deficiencies of Board of Pardons' 
4
 The Court heard arguments from both sides, afterwhich it 
determined that Northern had been afforded procedural due process 
at the July 8, 1988 hearing. 
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actions, but will not review the reasonableness of the Board's 
discretionary decisions. 
B. THE COURT OF APPEALS ADDRESSED 
THE BOARD OF PARDONS' ACTIONS 
WITH RESPECT TO ITS OWN RULES 
AND REGULATIONS AND FOUND NO 
DUE PROCESS VIOLATION. 
Northern grossly misstates the Court of Appeals opinion by 
asserting that the court failed to decide important issues of due 
process presented to it. (See Petition for Certiorari at 9). Based 
on such, Northern claims that the Court of Appeals "departed from 
the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings" which, if 
true would constitute a basis for certiorari review. Utah R. App. 
P. 46(c). (See Petition at 9). Contrary to Northern's assertions, 
the Court of Appeals heard oral arguments relating to the Board of 
Pardons' policies and rules, and thereafter determined that 
"Northern was afforded full procedural due process by the July 8, 
1988 hearing." Northern, 179 Utah Adv. Rep. at 16. 
Finding no procedural error, the Court of Appeals addressed 
Northern's allegations as to the reasonableness of the Board's 
decision in rescinding his original parole date. The court 
properly held that the Board's decision to rescind Northern's 
original release date was a valid exercise of its discretion 
conferred by U.C.A. § 76-3-202(5) (1989). Since judicial review 
exists only as to alleged procedural deficiencies, the court had no 
occasion to review the Board of Pardons' discretionary decision for 
reasonableness. 
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CONCLUSION 
Northern's disappointment with the Board's decision does not 
make it violative of due process or any other right. The Court of 
Appeals found no procedural due process violation, and it is well 
settled that there is no substantive due process right to parole or 
early release. See Houtz v. DeLand, 718 F. Supp. 1497 (D. Utah 
1989); Connecticut Board of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S 458, 465 
(1981); Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369 (1987); Greenholtz 
v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1 (1979). 
The Court of Appeals classified Northern's allegations as attacks 
on the reasonableness of the Board of Pardons' decision to rescind 
his original release date. Finding such decisions discretionary, 
and thus not subject to judicial review, the court held habeas 
relief inappropriate. 
The foregoing establishes that the decision below does not 
conflict with Foote v. Utah Board of Pardons, 808 P.2d 734 (Utah 
1991), and that the court in fact addressed Northern's claims. The 
court reviewed the record for procedural deficiencies, consistent 
with Foote, and simply found none. Northern's disappointment with 
the court's decision does not warrant review by writ of certiorari. 
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WHEREFORE, the Court should deny the Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 32 T^w day of April, 1992. 
Paul Van Dam 
Attorney General 
renzo K. vMiller 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondents 
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